The impact of segregation on Black political efficacy is theoretically ambiguous. On one hand, increased contact among Blacks in more segregated areas may mean that Blacks are better able to coordinate political behavior. On the other hand, lesser contact with non-Blacks may mean that Blacks have less political influence over voters of other races. As for non-Blacks, inter-group conflict theory suggests that greater contact yields greater conflict between the groups while inter-group contact theory suggests exactly the reverse. We investigate this question empirically. We find that exogenous increases in segregation lead to decreases in Black civic efficacy, as measured by an ability to elect Representatives who vote liberally and more specifically in favor of legislation that is favored by Blacks. This tendency for Representatives from more segregated MSAs to vote more conservatively arises in spite of the fact that Blacks in more segregated areas hold more liberal political views than do Blacks in less segregated locales. We find evidence that this decrease in efficacy is driven by more conservative attitudes amongst non-Blacks in more segregated areas.
Black civic efficacy is ambiguous. On the one hand, the more segregated Blacks are the more contact they have with other Blacks and thus the more likely they are to be able to influence Black political behavior. On the other hand, the less segregated Blacks are the more contact they have with non-Blacks and the more likely they are to be able to influence non-Black political behavior. As for non-Blacks' propensity to align themselves politically with Blacks, inter-group conflict theory suggests that greater contact yields greater conflict between the groups while inter-group contact theory suggests exactly the reverse. (See for example Taylor 1998 and Bobo 1988 on inter-group conflict theory and Johnson et. al 2000 and Johnson et. al , 2001 on inter-group contact theory).
We bring empirical evidence to bear on this theoretical ambiguity. Clearly the challenge to an empirical analysis of the impact of segregation on any outcome is the endogeneity of segregation. (For example, perhaps non-Black residents' preference for interactions with Blacks influences both the level of segregation and the level of Black efficacy.) We circumvent this difficulty by using the railroad division index developed in Ananat (2007) to instrument for segregation. Before the Great Migration--the large movement of Blacks from the South to the North during the years 1915 to 1950 4 --Blacks predominantly lived in former slave-holding states. The instrument exploits the fact that this Great Migration occurred after the vast majority of the country's present day railroad tracks had been laid. The more subdivisions created in a city by the tracks (conditional on the total amount of track in the city), the easier it was in that city to confine (segregate) Blacks in neighborhoods whose boundaries were defined by these tracks. (One limitation of this identification strategy is that we can only explore the impact of segregation on civic efficacy outside of the South.)
Employing the railroad instrument, we find that in the non-South, segregation, conditional on area racial heterogeneity, has a negative causal impact on Black civic efficacy. The more segregated the metro area, the less likely that its residents are represented in the United States House by a Black representative or by an individual of either race who is from the Democratic Party 5 or who votes in accordance with the desires of Black residents on civil rights and other issues. Although the relationship between segregation and our various measures of efficacy is not always significant, it is remarkably consistent. The negative relationship has held from the first redistricting period after the Voting Rights Act through the most recently completed redistricting period (or from 1973-2002) . Given evidence that the tendency for Blacks to align themselves towards the left in the political continuum is increasing in segregation, our findings demonstrate that Black civic efficacy is decreasing in segregation.
What is the channel by which segregation impacts Black civic efficacy? We find no evidence that variation in district demographic configuration drives our results. We also rule out variation in voter turnout by race as a possible explanation. We do, however, find evidence that in more segregated areas non-Blacks are more likely to hold negative views of Blacks and of policies that aid Blacks. Further, we find some support for the argument that segregation increases divergence between Black and non-Black political views. Because Blacks are a minority of the population in all metro areas, this polarization could explain the finding that Black civic efficacy is decreasing in segregation.
As exemplified by the quotations with which we began, there is a deep-seated belief in this country in the ability to effect change by pulling a lever on Election Day. 5 Blacks vote Democratic 70 to 90% of the time in two-party elections (McDermott 1998) .
Such a belief implies that Black political efficacy may be a mediator in the relationship between segregation and Black economic outcomes. Thus our results suggest that decreased political efficacy may explain in part why Blacks' economic outcomes are decreasing in segregation. 6 We present these results in detail, after describing the data and methodology in the next section.
II Data and Methods

II.A Sample
We examine the changing relationship between segregation and political outcomes across decades. Our focal period is 1973 Our unit of observation in each decade is the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). 8 We focus on the MSA for two reasons: First, The MSA is not a political unit.
Political boundaries, most notably congressional districts, are defined by the individuals who hold political power. 9 The relationship between segregation and political units may be endogenous. Thus we measure segregation at the MSA level, treating the configuration of the congressional districts to which MSA residents belong as an outcome variable. Second, a focus on MSAs avoids a second source of endogeneity: intra-urban 6 We recognize, however, that the direction of causation may also run from economic outcomes to civic efficacy. 7 We also include the 1972 election which chose the members of the 93 rd Congress which commenced in 1973. 8 A Metropolitan Statistical Area is comprised of a county or set of counties that contain a central city of at least 50,000 inhabitants "plus adjacent counties with a high degree of integration with the central county as measured by commuting" (Office of Management and Budget 2000, 82238) . 9 States are political units whose boundaries are not decided by those who currently hold power. However, many states are too large (and contain too many areas in which Blacks do not reside) to speak about state segregation meaningfully. Nearly 90% of Black Americans live within an MSA. (McKinnon 2003). residential sorting (Cutler and Glaeser 1997) . For example, the most politically efficacious Blacks may choose to live in the least segregated parts of the metro area.
More specifically, we examine outcomes for 312 10 MSAs identified by Cutler and Glaeser (1997) as having more than 1000 Black residents in the 1990 Census. One difficulty in comparing MSAs from decade to decade is that MSA definitions change with each census. We overcome this limitation by holding our MSA definitions constant 11 as we trace political outcomes back to the 1970's.
II.B. Segregation Indexes
Our primary measure of segregation is the dissimilarity index, defined as where
is the array of census tracts in the area. According to this measure, the level of segregation in our sample has fallen across the three decades. The first row of 16 We do not adjust these scores for comparability across years as prescribed by Groseclose, Levitt and Snyder (1999 to include all elections and congresses based on the respective census. 27 (Recall that the measures of segregation are also created using the census.) 24 In the case of New England we do the match by county and by town. The county match may give an overestimate of the districts in the MSA because counties are not contained by MSA boundaries within New England. On the other hand towns may give an underestimate of the districts in the MSA because it is not possible to look up the correspondence between unincorporated areas within an MSA and a district. County/district correspondence comes from 103 rd Congressional District Geographic Entity File, 1990 (ICPSR 6425) and Census of Population and Housing, 1980, Congressional District Equivalency File, 99 th Congress. County/district correspondence for 1970, town/district correspondence for all years, and intra decennial redistricting correspondence come from Congressional District Atlas (multiple years). 25 Or portions of more than one district. 26 We would like to weight this average by the fraction of MSA residents who live in the district. Unfortunately, these data are only available for the districts created with the 1990 redistricting. For 1990 we run specifications using outcomes created by weighted averages as well as those created by simple averages. Results are robust to this change. 27 Although the majority of congressional redistricting is done between the census year and the election that follows two years later, states are free to redistrict at any time. Therefore we match MSAs to districts by congressional session and not by decade.
II.D Methodology
For each decade, we are interested in the following equation:
where outcome is one of the political efficacy measures defined in the previous section, segregation is the dissimilarity score and perblk is the percent of the MSA's population that is Black. Blacks may be more efficacious where they are a larger percentage of the population. We condition on percent Black to isolate the effects of segregation, conditional on area ethnic heterogeneity. Previous literature has shown an association between demographic characteristics (such as education, poverty status, employment status and age) and political participation and political choice. (See for example Leighly and Nagler, 1992 and Wolfinger and Rosenstone,1980) . However, we do not control for these demographics in our most basic specification because the demographic make up of the MSA is in fact endogenous to segregation. For example, Ananat (2007) shows that segregation affects the average level of education, income and even movement into an MSA. By omitting these endogenous demographics we capture the full effect of segregation on each outcome of interest (including any intermediary effects on demographic characteristics.) 28 The limitation of equation 2 is that the coefficient β 1 cannot be interpreted causally due to the potential endogeneity of segregation. For example, perhaps non-Black residents' preference for interactions with Blacks influences both the level of segregation and the level of Black efficacy--such an influence might lead our OLS results to be biased in a negative direction. Or perhaps the most politically active Blacks prefer to live primarily among Blacks--such a preference might lead our OLS results to be biased in a positive direction. The great shortcoming of the OLS results is that we cannot even sign their bias.
We overcome this limitation by following a 2SLS approach; we instrument for segregation using Ananat's (2007) railroad division index (RDI). Before the Great Migration, Blacks predominantly lived in former slave holding states. 29 The RDI instrument exploits the fact that the Great Migration, the large movement of Blacks from the South to the North during the years 1915 to 1950, occurred after the vast majority of the country's present day railroad tracks had been laid. The more subdivisions within a city created by the tracks, the easier it was in that city to confine (segregate) Blacks in neighborhoods whose boundaries were defined by these tracks. The RDI is defined as
where i represents a subdivision of the central city of an MSA created by railroad track. 30 An RDI of zero would mean that there are no tracks running through the MSA. An RDI of one would mean that the MSA is infinitely divided by railroads with each area having an area of near zero.
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Our first stage equation is (4) 
29 Ananat (2007) estimates that in 1910 90% of Blacks still lived in former slave states of Delaware, Maryland, the District of Columbia, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, Texas and Arkansas. 30 Ananat (2007) defines the center city as the four kilometer radius circle around the centroid of the population center in the early 20 th century. Such an approach means that historical variations in city size will not distort the RDI measure. 31 Atack and Passell (1994) estimate that 75% of total track in the United States had been laid by 1900. Nonetheless, to better capture the pre-Great Migration track configuration Ananat (2007) calculates the RDI using historical maps with a median year of creation of 1909.
There is a mechanical relationship between tracklength and RDI. We therefore control for tracklength out of a concern that the amount of track laid in a city may relate to how prosperous the city was and therefore how desirable a location it was for, for instance, the most politically efficacious Blacks (Ananat 2007) . (Our first stage estimates for the three decades are found in the first three columns of Table II.) Our second stage is (5) outcome i = αι+ β 1 (segregation) i + β 2 (perblk) i + β 3 (tracklength) + u i. .
The assumption of our identification strategy is that RDI at the beginning of the twentieth century does not predict Black civic efficacy at the century's end, except through its effect on segregation. There are two obvious ways in which that assumption could be violated. First, RDI could be correlated with early twentieth century MSA characteristics which impact later twentieth century political efficacy. Second, the instrument may have a direct impact on Black civic efficacy or its correlates.
RDI does not predict early twentieth century MSA politics. Table   III provides no evidence that our instrument affects present day Black civic efficacy through an impact on early twentieth century politics. 32 The denominator is the number who cast ballots for one of the two major parties. Ananat (2007) As stated above, an additional concern about our identification strategy is that RDI may have a direct impact on Black civic efficacy or its correlates. Ananat (2007) presents evidence that the instrument does not impact later twentieth century outcomes, except through its effect on segregation. The concern is that railroad configuration could impact land values and therefore residential income segregation. She provides evidence against this channel by demonstrating that RDI does not predict 1990 income segregation. 34 Further, given her results of a positive relationship between RDI and White economic outcomes (in contrast to a negative relationship between RDI and Black economic outcomes), Ananat (2007) argues that RDI operates through race rather than through income.
One limitation of this identification strategy is that we can only create the instrument for those MSAs which meet two criteria: 1) They are not located in former 33 European ethnic immigrant segregation was then at its historical peak, according to Massey and Denton (1993) . Its historical peak was quite low relative to the historical peak of black segregation-the maximum isolation index was 0.39 for Italians in Worcester, MA, in 1910 (Vigdor 2006) ; by contrast, the median isolation index for blacks in 1970 was .37. 34 Income segregation is insignificant in the U.S. relative to racial segregation; the highest dissimilarity index for income in 1990 is .28, while the lowest 1990 dissimilarity for African-Americans is .33.
slave states and 2) Ananat (2007) percent Black is smaller in the 2SLS sample than in the full sample. In the next section we detail our results.
III Results
III.A. Political Efficacy
Segregation had a negative impact on Black civic efficacy in the 1990s, results in Specifications reported in this column are the basic specifications weighted by the log of the number of Black residents of the MSA. We choose to weight in logs rather than levels because we are uncomfortable allowing an MSA's influence on our estimation to be proportional to the size of its Black population due to the presence of three outlier MSAs with Black populations an order of magnitude greater than the sample mean. As indicated in the data and methods section, district outcomes are averaged to form MSA level outcomes. For the 1990s only, we have data that allow us to population-39 These differences calculated based on the 107 th Congress, the most recent term included in our analysis. 40 In the 2SLS sample the average number of Blacks in an MSA in 1990 is approximately 50,000. Three MSAs-Detroit, Philadelphia and Los Angeles-have Black populations of greater than 500,000. Level weighted regressions would essentially be driven by these three MSAs.
weight our averages to form a better measure of the representation that the average MSA resident faces. 41 The final column of the table presents the coefficients from specifications which use the population-weighted measures. In terms of both magnitude and significance, coefficients are little changed from column 4 to column 6, indicating that our column 4 results are not driven by our weighting procedure. Thus we can be more confident in our results as we trace the impact of segregation back through the 1970s.
Looking back across decades, we learn that segregation has had a consistent negative impact on Black civic efficacy since the first redistricting following the Voting Rights Act. See In the remainder of the paper we trace the process backward from political outcomes to the development of political viewpoints to examine at what point(s) segregation causes Blacks to be less efficacious.
III.B.1. Redistricting
While the process of redistricting varies from state to state, in no state is the process determined orthogonally to the racial composition of the neighborhoods within.
Federal case law stipulates that districts be compact and contiguous (Stokes 1998) . 42 We ignore a fourth step where the elected politician must choose whether to enact the policy that the people desire. We assume, given its repeated game nature, that House members do enact the will of the people on average.
Therefore the extent of segregation in neighborhoods may mechanically impact upon the racial composition of districts. Given that it is a federal requirement that redistricting schemes provide "equality of opportunity" for minority voters (Stokes 1998) In Table V Panel B we examine the extent to which segregation predicts the spread of Blacks in districts throughout a metropolitan area. 45 It is possible that Blacks are less efficacious in more segregated areas because, following the reasoning of Cameron, Epstein and O'Halloran (1996) , Blacks are confined to more heavily Black 43 In the South, the optimal strategy, according to Cameron, Epstein and O'Halloran (1996) , is to create as many districts of about 47% Black as possible. 44 Cameron, Epstein and O'Halloran (1996) districts in these metro areas. To investigate this supposition we continue to run models In the final row of Table V we measure the spread of Blacks across districts within an MSA using a different metric: the standard deviation of the districts' percent 46 Because of data limitations, we are unable to measure the percent Black for each redistricting that occurs. Therefore we measure these outcomes once per decade, at the time of the first election following the most recent census.
Black. (The limitation of this measure is, of course, that it is not defined for MSAs whose residents are all assigned to the same district.) Once again, we find no evidence of segregation increasing the variation in percent Black across districts. In fact the relationship between segregation and standard deviation is negative, although insignificant, across the three decades. Cameron, Epstein and O'Halloran (1996) assert that substantive representation of Blacks is decreasing in the standard deviation of district percent Black in an area. Assuming their assertion correct, the results of Table V Panel B provide no evidence that district configuration is the mechanism by which segregation has lessened Black political efficacy across three decades. 
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We examine the impact of segregation on voting behavior (as well as political attitudes) using data from the National Election Studies (NES), a biennial survey of 47 We also investigated the possibility that non-MSA residents who share districts with MSA residents may be more (less) sympathetic to Black political interests and therefore driving the relationship between segregation and Black civic efficacy. However we find no support for such a hypothesis. We find no evidence that more segregated MSAs are carved into significantly more/fewer districts than less segregated MSAs. These findings are not surprising given that our results in Table IV are not altered significantly by population weighting outcomes. 48 This is just one mechanism by which segregation could impact turnout. Coate and Conlin's (2004) group rule utilitarian model suggests that segregation could impact turnout because in a segregated area it may be easier to enforce group norms.
United States residents of voting age. Using these data we run 2SLS models, separately for Black and non-Black respondents, of the following form:
(6) outcome i = αι+ β 1 (segregation) i + β 2 (tracklength) i + u i. . 
III.B.3. Political Attitudes
Thus far our findings suggest that neither district configuration nor racial variation in turnout accounts for segregation's negative impact on Black political efficacy. A third explanation is that political views of Blacks and non-Blacks are more divergent in more segregated areas. Blacks are not a majority of residents in any time or 49 We use respondents' states and congressional districts to match them to our time invariantly defined MSAs. In cases where a district lies in more than one MSA we define the respondent's level of segregation as the average segregation in the MSAs. Reported regression results are thus clustered at the district level. However, the significance of our results is robust to clustering at the state level. 50 We define the survey years 1972-1980 as the 1970s, 1982-1990 as the 1980s and 1992-2000 the 1990s. place in our sample frame. Therefore, as non-Black political views move increasingly far from Black political views, by definition, Blacks move farther away from the mean (and likely the median) viewpoint. We examine the evidence for the divergent views explanation in the remainder of Table VI . In this table we continue to present the results from models of the form of equations 6 and 7 using the NES (and NSBA where possible.)
In the second panel of the table entitled "Attitudes toward Race" we explore the impact of segregation on racial tolerance and support for policies which benefit Blacks.
Our first outcome is non-Black respondents' feelings about Blacks measured on a scale of 0 (very negative) to 100 (very positive). The -.889 coefficient in the 1970s regression is unfortunately too imprecise to be informative. However, the 1980s and 1990s
coefficients say that an increase in segregation of one standard deviation results in a significant decrease in non-Black feelings about Blacks of .06 and .18 standard deviations respectively. 51 In the remainder of the row we examine Black feelings toward Whites (the largest non-Black subgroup). Point estimates suggest that feelings about Whites are increasing in segregation in the 1980s and decreasing in segregation in the 1990s.
However, all estimates are far too imprecise to be informative.
Next, we examine how segregation impacts feelings about race-based policy. The focal question asks respondents whether they support government policies to improve the social and economic position of Blacks. Respondents were asked to place themselves on a seven point scale from a low of 1 (Government should help Blacks) to a high of 7 (Blacks should help themselves the view that Blacks should help themselves (from a mean of 2.3 in the 1970s to 3.8 in the 1990s). Point estimates of the impact of segregation on this belief suggest that the tendency, among non-Blacks, to believe that Blacks should help themselves is increasing in segregation across decades. The relationship is significant in the 1980s and 1990s, when a one standard deviation increase in segregation predicts an increase in this belief of .11 and .17 standard deviations respectively. Results for Blacks, though never significant, are opposite signed from non-Blacks in the 1980s and near zero in the 1990s.
Thus the "Attitudes toward Race" panel provides evidence that the relationship between segregation and Black civic efficacy may be driven by non-Black support for Blacks and policies that favor Blacks, as this support is decreasing in segregation.
Next we look at the impact of segregation on political attitudes more generally.
The first outcome of interest is the respondent's view of how liberal/conservative s/he is on a scale from 1 (extremely liberal) to 7 (extremely conservative). Across decades, the non-Black mean on this measure has hovered around 4.3 while the Black mean has grown from 3.3 to 3.8. Reported in the first row under "Political Attitudes," point estimates from specifications using this outcome suggest that, across decades, polarization in political views is increasing in segregation. While conservative identification is increasing in segregation amongst non-Blacks, liberal identification is increasing in segregation amongst Blacks. The relationship is significant only for nonBlacks in the 1980s and 1990s, where a one standard deviation increase in segregation increases the mean tendency toward conservatism by .18 and .27 standard deviations respectively.
The second more general political attitude we examine is party identification. The NES asks respondents to place themselves on a scale from 1 (strong Democrat) to 7
(strong Republican Brophy (1945) , Deutsch and Collins (1951) , Jackman and Crane (1986) , Putnam (1966) and Wilner et. al. (1952) . 54 We do not perform this exercise for Blacks due to the small sample size. community 55 within the past two years. In other words, we focus on adults who recently selected to live in the area. Looking at the first measure, the Black thermometer, we find in both the 1970s and 1980s, the relationship between selecting a more segregated area and attitude toward Blacks is insignificant. However, in the 1990s we find that those who have chosen more segregated areas have significantly more negative ratings of Blacks. In fact in the 1990s, for four of five attitudinal outcomes we find that individuals who select more segregated areas hold significantly more conservative views than those who select less segregated areas. At least for the 1990s, it appears that selection does play a role in linking segregation and decreased Black political efficacy.
In the final three columns of 
IV Conclusion
Blacks in more segregated metropolitan areas fare worse than their counterparts in less segregated areas on a variety of economic outcomes. In this paper, we explore the connection between segregation and political efficacy, an outcome that to our knowledge has not been studied in relation to segregation.
We find that Black political efficacy (as measured by the ability to elect representatives who vote in accordance with the preferences of Black voters) is decreasing in segregation. This result does not arise because of differential district configuration or because of differential voter turnout by race. We do find evidence that the efficacy result is due to variation in attitudes. Non-Blacks have more conservative political views in more segregated areas. Given the belief in this country in the ability to effect change through political activity, our results may explain in part why Blacks' economic outcomes are decreasing in segregation. 1972-1980, 1982-1990 and 1992-2000. 2 The decades are defined here as the Congresses that spanned the years 1973-1982, 1983-1992, 1993-2002. 
